Paper tigers or sleeping beauties? National parliaments in the post-Lisbon European political system. CEPS Special Report/February 2011 by Kaczynski, Piotr Macief.
 
 
Paper tigers or sleeping beauties? 
National Parliaments in the post-Lisbon 
European Political System 
 
 
CEPS Special Report/February 2011 
 
 
Piotr Maciej Kaczyński 
 
There remains a degree of uncertainty about the role of national parliaments in 
the European system of governance under the rules of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
The legion of 10,000 national parliamentarians should guard the principle of 
subsidiarity in EU legislation, which now constitutes about one quarter of all 
laws adopted in member states. Confusion arises over how many of the new 
post-Lisbon prerogatives belong to individual national chambers, and how many 
require a collective response. Until the ‘collective’ voice is organised effectively, 
national parliaments will remain ‘paper tigers’ in the EU decision-making 
process. The national chambers’ powers could have far-reaching consequences, 
however, as one of their roles is to contribute to the ‘good governance’ of the 
European Union. Even though the readiness of national chambers to engage 
actively in EU affairs is limited, it is on the increase, albeit disproportionately.  
 
 
ISBN 978-94-6138-076-0  
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu) 
© Piotr Maciej Kaczyński, 2011 
 
 
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity 
and not to any institution with which she is associated. This publication may be reproduced or 
transmitted in any form for non-profit purposes only and on the condition that the source is fully 
acknowledged. 
Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.  Inter-parliamentary cooperation before 1 December 2009 ................................................... 2 
2.  Provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon ........................................................................................ 3 
3.  Implications for decision-making  .......................................................................................... 4 
4.  Preparations for the Treaty’s entry into force ....................................................................... 6 
5.  The application of the national parliaments’ prerogatives .................................................... 8 
Political dialogue  ....................................................................................................................... 8 
Inter-parliamentary cooperation .............................................................................................. 10 
6.  Political consequences of the new system  ........................................................................... 13 
7.  The political readiness to be engaged.................................................................................. 14 
8.  Concluding questions .......................................................................................................... 15 
 
  
1 | 
PAPER TIGERS OR SLEEPING BEAUTIES? 
NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE POST-LISBON 
EUROPEAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 
CEPS Special Report/February 2011 
PIOTR MACIEJ KACZYŃSKI
 * 
Introduction 
Among the promises offered by the Treaty of Lisbon, one of the biggest was to increase the 
democratic legitimacy of the European project. A crucial element in this process was the further 
empowerment of national parliamentary chambers. Their general institutional role is to 
“contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union”. One year after the treaty entered into 
force, the national parliaments began to prepare themselves for the new powers allocated to 
them. The problem is that most of the national parliamentary chambers seem to have understood 
this objective, but only on an individual level – not necessarily on a collective one. 
The question for debate is, therefore: should the new provisions allocated to the national 
parliaments be considered primarily (or only) as an individual empowerment of each of the 
chambers in the European decision-making process, with each national chamber having an 
individual veto power on a proposed treaty change? Or should the provisions be seen as a 
collective responsibility of a majority (or large proportion) of national chambers (i.e. is a 
quarter, a third or a half of national parliaments’ voices necessary to use the new procedures 
labelled as ‘yellow’ or ‘orange’
1)? The experience of the first year is rather that the first stage 
has become more of a fact; the second stage has not yet materialised. 
The Treaty of Lisbon equipped the national parliaments collectively with a de facto power to 
veto European Commission (or any other institution’s) legislative proposals before they are 
subject to adoption by the two legislative bodies, the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers. The technical and political cooperation between the national parliaments stretches 
back over 20 years. The new ‘yellow’ and ‘orange’ card procedure focuses on the respect of the 
subsidiary principle. Depending on how the new ‘yellow’ and ‘orange’ card procedure is used, it 
can become a major obstacle to European decision-making, but at the same time it can have the 
effect of strengthening the European Union’s democratic legitimacy. The questions are, 
therefore: if the national parliaments use this new instrument, how should they do so, technically 
and in what policy fields? 
There was a certain scepticism among the participants of the European Convention whenever 
the issue of the increased role of national parliaments came up for discussion; this new ‘early 
warning’ system would never work in practice, it was thought. There were – and remain – two 
major obstacles. The first is technical: there is an eight-week time limit in which to initiate the 
                                                      
* Piotr Maciej Kaczyński is a Research Fellow at CEPS. He expresses his gratitude for the generous 
support received for this research from the Böll Stiftung. 
1 The ‘yellow card’ procedure or ‘early warning mechanism’ is a mechanism whereby a third of national 
chambers can raise an objection (‘yellow card’) on the basis of the violation of the principle of 
subsidiarity. The proposal must then be reviewed by the initiating institution (in most cases the 
Commission). The ‘orange card’ means that a majority of national chambers found a breach of the 
subsidiarity principle; the legislators (the Parliament and the Council) must then take a position on the 
subsidiarity before working on the legislation (see more below). PIOTR MACIEJ KACZYŃSKI | 2  
 
procedure of arriving at a collective voice in the national chambers. The second is political: will 
there be enough interest in national capitals among decision-makers to engage in the process at 
an early stage? There are about 10,000 national parliamentarians who live and operate in 27 
political landscapes and according to 27 political agendas. Channelling their interests is 
probably an impossible mission without necessary coordination instruments. For the system to 
work at all, a higher degree of information exchange is key – here the other national parliaments 
are the natural and most obvious partners, alongside the national governments and EU 
institutions (especially the Commission and the European Parliament). 
1. Inter-parliamentary  cooperation before 1 December 2009 
The cooperation of national parliaments was initiated in the 1980s in the aftermath of the first 
direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979. Initially, the dialogue was conducted on a 
purely ad hoc basis. In 1989 the inter-parliamentary “Conference of Community and European 
Affairs Committees” (COSAC) was established. Its existence was consolidated by the 
introduction of a protocol on the role of national parliaments in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). 
Since the very first meeting of national parliaments the issue has been how to increase national 
parliamentary control over EU affairs. 
COSAC enables a regular exchange of information, best practices and views on European 
Union matters between European Affairs Committees of national parliaments and the European 
Parliament. It holds meetings twice a year, where six members represent each parliament. The 
presidency of COSAC is linked to the rotating presidency of the Council.  
Apart from COSAC, the framework of inter-parliamentary cooperation takes other forms, such 
as the Conference of Speakers of the European Union Parliaments, which meets annually. The 
president of the European Parliament takes part in those meetings and the Conference adopts 
rules of procedure of inter-parliamentary cooperation. Other formats are regular meetings of the 
representatives of national parliaments to the EU (Monday Morning Meetings, or MMM), Joint 
Parliamentary Meetings on topics of common interest between the national parliamentarians and 
the members of the European Parliament, as well as the meetings of sectoral committees. The 
primary tool aimed at facilitating cooperation is the Inter-parliamentary EU Information 
Exchange (IPEX),
2 which is a platform for the electronic exchange of EU-related information 
between national parliaments in the Union. 
The Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam allowed for an information exchange between the European institutions and 
national parliaments. The Commission was mandated to send all its consultation documents to 
national parliaments (Article 1 of the Protocol) and the legislative documents could be 
forwarded to the national parliaments by the national governments – yet there was no obligation 
to do so (Article 2 of the Protocol). Through COSAC the national parliaments could scrutinize 
the subsidiarity principle and inform the Commission, Council and the Parliament about their 
position (Article 6 of the Protocol). They could also examine any legislative proposal or 
initiative in the area of freedom, security and justice that might have a direct impact on the 
rights and freedoms of individuals and send their comments to the Commission, Council and the 
Parliament (Article 5 of the Protocol).  
What the Amsterdam decision meant was a formal recognition of the right of national 
parliaments to be engaged in the European process. National parliaments were not the only 
consultative body, as there was also the Committee of the Regions (CoR) for example, or the 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). If Amsterdam levelled the powers of 
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national parliaments (through COSAC) with that of EESC or CoR, the Convention on the 
Future of Europe and the subsequent Inter-Governmental Conferences have changed these 
dynamics considerably.  
The composition of the Convention on the Future of Europe (2001-2003) was organised in an 
original way. The body also included representatives of national parliaments as full members 
alongside representatives of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the 
national governments. This has had an important consequence: the negotiated draft Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe created the aforementioned ‘yellow’ card procedure. It 
provides the national parliaments with the possibility to withdraw a Commission legislative 
proposal before it is considered by the Parliament and the Council. The rejection of the draft 
Constitutional Treaty and emergence of the Treaty of Lisbon did not reverse the trend of 
strengthening the position of national parliaments vis-à-vis the existing treaties. It gave the 
national parliaments two more weeks (the previous version envisaged a six week deadline) to 
consider using the subsidiarity check. More importantly, it also established a stronger ‘orange’ 
card procedure. 
2.  Provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon 
According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the main task of the national parliaments’ engagement in the 
European decision-making process is to ‘contribute actively to the good functioning of the 
Union’. The main instrument – yet not the only one – to deliver on this is the new subsidiarity 
check clause. In more detail, the Treaty provides for the following forms of engagement of 
national parliaments: 
1.  Article 12 of the Treaty on the European Union:  
a.  ensures that national parliaments have information on all draft legislative acts of 
the Union; 
b.  establishes the subsidiarity control system (with details in the Protocol 2, see 
below); and  
c.  provides for the participation of national parliaments in the evaluation mechanisms 
in the area of freedom, security and justice, including:  
i.  political monitoring of Europol; and  
ii.  evaluation of Eurojust's activities; 
d.  involves national parliaments in the revision procedures of the Treaties and ensures 
that they are fully informed about the accession applications; and 
e.  confirms the inter-parliamentary cooperation between national parliaments and 
with the European Parliament. 
2.  Protocol on the role of national parliaments (Protocol 1) establishes a procedure in 
which the Commission directly informs the national parliament about its non-legislative 
and legislative proposals, including the annual legislative programme. Other actors with 
legislative powers also send their draft legislative proposals to the national parliament. 
The national parliaments have eight weeks in which to react to these proposals before the 
legislative process begins.  
3.  Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
(Protocol 2) establishes the rules of the subsidiarity check by national parliaments. If 
there is suspicion of a breach of the subsidiary principle, each national parliament or each 
chamber of a national parliament has eight weeks in which to communicate to the PIOTR MACIEJ KACZYŃSKI | 4  
 
presidents of the European Commission, European Council and the Council the reasons 
why it considers that a given draft does not respect the principle of subsidiarity. Regional 
parliaments with legislative powers can be also consulted. Two procedures can emerge 
from this process: 
a.  ‘Yellow’ card (Article 7, para. 2 of the Protocol): if a third of European national 
parliaments (two votes per country, one vote per chamber in bicameral systems) 
considers a subsidiarity principles breach, that a given draft legislation needs to be 
reviewed (a quarter in the justice, freedom and security area). The Commission – 
or any other legislative initiator for that matter – does not have to formally 
withdraw its proposal and can keep the original proposal in place. However, it does 
need to explain its decision. It will do so in a form of a Communication.  
b.  ‘Orange’ card (Article 7, para. 3 of the Protocol): should there be more than half of 
the national parliaments considering a subsidiary principle breach (but only in 
policy areas adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure) and the Commission 
still wants to proceed with the unchanged text, then the national parliaments’ 
opinions (‘why the proposal breaches the subsidiarity principle’) and the 
Commission’s reasoned opinion (‘why the proposal respects the subsidiarity 
principle’) are transmitted to the Union legislators. The Parliament and the Council 
need to take a decision on the existence (or not) of the subsidiarity breach before 
dealing with the proposal itself. The Parliament decides by a majority of votes cast 
on the issue. The Council requires a 55% majority of votes to decide if there is a 
subsidiary breach. If any of them share the opinion of the national parliaments – 
then the legislative proposal will not proceed. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union oversees the application of the principle of subsidiarity (Article 8 of the 
Protocol).  
4.  The representatives of the national parliaments are going to participate as full members in 
any future ordinary treaty revision (that is, involving establishment of a convention 
drafting a text), unless the European Council (with the consent of the European 
Parliament) decides that a given change does not necessitate a convention method.  
5.  The national parliaments also gained the power to veto the application of the passerelle 
clause  (Article 48 para. 7). The clause can be used to change the decision-making 
mechanism from unanimity to majority voting in the Council, or change the special 
legislative procedure to an ordinary one (i.e. give greater oversight of a policy to the 
European Parliament). Such a decision can be taken by the European Council only by 
unanimity. However, any individual national parliamentary chamber has an individual 
veto power within six months following the proposal. The same procedure applies to a 
specific passerelle clause, which can be decided by the Council on legislation concerning 
family law with cross border implications (Article 81, TFEU). Here too any individual 
national parliamentary chamber can veto the decision within six months.  
3.  Implications for decision-making 
The initial application of the treaties’ provisions is far from complete. Among the first thoughts 
on the issue of the practical role of the national parliaments in the system is the fact that the 
treaties do not include a precise definition of subsidiarity. In the process, such a definition could 
be worked out by national parliaments themselves and communicated to the Commission – so 
that it knows more precisely what needs to be respected. 
Second, there is a certain lack of clarity regarding the procedures to monitor subsidiarity in the 
later stages of negotiations when the draft law enters the decision-making process in the 5 | PAPER TIGERS OR SLEEPING BEAUTIES? 
 
Parliament and the Council; these are not yet clear even for the Commission’s own 
amendments. A partial answer is provided by the right to bring the EU laws before the European 
Court of Justice for the subsidiarity control (Article 8 of the Protocol 2). As some authors have 
already indicated, the implications of the involvement of the Court of Justice in the process 
could be significant. For example, there is a risk of delays in legislation or even greater 
politicisation of the process by the Court. The Court of Justice could possibly even establish a 
working definition of ‘subsidiarity’.
3 
Third, the role of regional parliaments with legislative powers needs still to be clarified. This 
process is taking place now; in fact there are a number of parallel processes that will eventually 
engage the regional parliaments in those countries where regional parliaments also have 
adequate competences. One element in the system is of particular importance in this regard; it 
may constitute a major challenge for those national parliamentary chambers that have to 
coordinate with regional parliaments to meet the eight-week deadline, or even to be able to 
scrutinise the impact correctly. This issue is particularly important in the following countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
Fourth, the eight-week delay will most likely have limited impact on the overall length of the 
legislative procedure in the European Union. The time for the national parliaments to react to 
legislative proposals has been extended from six to eight weeks. This obviously does not 
include potential court delays. As for the ‘pure’ delays caused by national parliaments only, the 
only major time delay concerns the use of the passerelle clauses – where the decision will be 
delayed by six months before coming into force. 
The Lisbon Treaty does not foresee any differentiation between national parliamentary 
chambers (in the bicameral systems) and treats them equally regardless of their functions or 
powers: “In the case of a bicameral Parliamentary system, each of the two chambers shall have 
one vote” (Article 7 of Protocol 2). In many countries the second chamber has limited – often 
specific – functions. Therefore, in some cases the Lisbon Treaty might in fact have empowered 
the chambers beyond the national constitutions.  
Finally, there is a clear distinction between the individual power of each of the national 
parliamentary chambers and the collective power of the national parliaments. The individual 
rights are the following: 
a.  The right to receive information on all draft EU legislation from the drafting institution 
(primarily the European Commission); 
b.  The right to participate and contribute to the future changes of the treaties whenever the 
change is channelled through an “ordinary revision procedure”; 
c.  The right to veto an attempt by the European Council to use a passerelle clause to change 
the decision-making process in the Council from unanimity to a majority or by replacing 
the special legislative procedure with an ordinary legislative procedure; 
d.  The right to take the issue of subsidiarity breach (of a law, not draft legislation) to the 
European Court of Justice (through the national government). 
The collective rights are the following: 
                                                      
3 See, for example, Raffaello Matarazzo (ed.), “The State of Democracy in the EU after the Lisbon 
Treaty”, IAI Quaderni, English series, Rome, April 2011 (forthcoming); Andrea Manzella, “The role of 
Parliaments in the democratic life of the Union”, in Micossi, S, and G.L. Tosato (eds), Europe in the 21st 
Century: Perspectives from the Lisbon Treaty, CEPS, Brussels 2009. PIOTR MACIEJ KACZYŃSKI | 6  
 
a.  The use of the yellow card procedure (a third of votes cast by national parliaments; a 
quarter in the area of justice, freedom and security); 
b.  The use of the orange card procedure (half of the votes being cast by national 
parliaments); 
c.  The right to be self-organised in inter-parliamentary cooperation. 
This dualism means that in adapting themselves to the new competences allocated by the Lisbon 
Treaty the national parliaments have had to implement changes on two levels. First on the 
national level, which includes the procedural rearrangement of the division of labour in the 
chamber(s), the potential clarification of roles between chambers in bicameral systems (i.e. in 
Ireland both chambers process the subsidiarity checks jointly) and the involvement of regional 
parliaments. The second level is the inter-parliamentary one, including the assessment of pre-
existing cooperation practices, including the COSAC.  
4.  Preparations for the Treaty’s entry into force  
On the inter-parliamentary level, the first challenge was to verify the technical capacities of 
national parliaments to deliver a quarter, a third or half of reasoned opinions on time within 
eight weeks. 
The try-outs 
The Treaty says that the national parliaments have eight weeks – if a subsidiarity breach is 
suspected – to communicate this information to the EU institutions. The question of 
implementation is how the national parliaments will organise themselves in this process. Unlike 
some other preparations for the new Treaty’s entry into force, the preparations of the national 
parliaments were not suspended after the first Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in June 
2008. 
Between 2005 and 2009, COSAC conducted eight ‘subsidiarity checks’ – try-outs of the 
incoming system aimed at verifying the national parliaments’ capacities and dedication to make 
the new system work.
4 It also served as an occasion to exchange ideas and familiarise the 
national parliamentarians and the national parliaments’ services with the ‘yellow’ and ‘orange’ 
card procedures. In short, during its twice-yearly meetings, COSAC took decisions to try out the 
application of the subsidiarity clause. The national parliaments examined the Commission’s 
legislative programme and flagged those elements in the legislative plan that might contradict 
the subsidiarity principle. The moment the Commission put forward a legislative proposal 
previously selected as potentially breaching the principle, the COSAC secretariat would initiate 
the consultation process. For the purposes of the exercise only two legislative proposals were 
selected every year. Even if the official deadline was eight weeks, in reality the national 
parliaments had more time to act – it is the national parliaments’ interpretation of this period; 
the time runs from the moment the official proposal is available in all EU official languages.
5 
The eight-week time limit does not include official breaks for the month of August. The checks 
were carried out by national parliaments according to their own laws and procedures. 
                                                      
4 More information on the exercise is available at http://www.cosac.eu/en/info/earlywarning/.  
5 In its Contribution to the EU Institutions in October 2007, the XXXVIII COSAC asked for a 
clarification of Article 6 of Protocol No. 2 to the Treaty on European Union (Protocol on the Application 
of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality) to the effect that the timeframe of eight weeks for 
the subsidiarity check should begin only when a draft legislative act is transmitted to national parliaments 
in all the official languages of the Union, Contribution of the XXXVIII COSAC, point 1.5; 
http://www.cosac.eu/en/meetings/Lisbon2007/plenary. 7 | PAPER TIGERS OR SLEEPING BEAUTIES? 
 
 
Table 1. Subsidiarity checks organised by COSAC, 2005-2009 
Try-out  
(draft legislative 
proposal): 
Timeline No.  of 
participating 
parliamentary 
chambers 
No. of 
participating 
states 
No. of 
breaches 
found (per 
chamber) 
No. of votes  
(2 votes per 
chamber in 
unicameral 
parliaments) 
1. 3rd Railway Package  Mar–Apr 
2005 
31/37 22/25  14/37  15/50  (EU-25) 
2. Regulation on the 
applicable law and 
jurisdiction in divorce 
matters 
Jul–Sep 
2006 
10/37 9/25  4/37  5/50 
3. Directive on postal 
services 
Nov–Dec 
2006 
10/37 9/25  1/37  2/50 
4. Framework Decision on 
combating terrorism 
Dec 2007-
Jan 2008 
25/40 20/27  1/40  1/54 
5. Directive implementing 
the principle of equal 
treatment between persons 
irrespective of religion or 
belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation 
Jul–Sep 
2008 
17/40 15/27  1/40  2/54 
6. Directive on standards 
of quality and safety of 
human organs intended for 
transplantation 
Dec 2008–
Feb 2009 
27/40 20/27  1/40  1/54 
7. Framework Decision on 
the right to interpretation 
and translation in criminal 
proceedings 
Jul – Sep 
2009 
21/40 17/27  3/40  5/54 
8. Regulation on 
jurisdiction, applicable 
law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions 
and authentic instruments 
in matters of succession 
and the creation of a 
European Certificate of 
Succession 
Oct – Dec 
2009 
36/40 25/27  1/40  1/54 
Source: Own compilation on the basis of the bi-annual COSAC reports. More information on all subsidiarity checks 
is available at http://www.cosac.eu/en/info/earlywarning/. 
Each of the national parliamentary chambers had the choice to participate or not in the try-outs. 
They were asked to provide information only if they considered a subsidiarity principle breach. 
They were also instructed to examine only for the subsidiarity principle, not the proportionality 
one. The last check ended after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force; 35 out of 40 national 
parliamentary chambers participated in the exercise within the deadline, three further 
parliaments failed to meet the deadline. Clearly, the national parliaments have the capacity to 
trigger the subsidiarity control break should they deem it necessary. Each participating chamber 
had to examine: 
1.  If it wanted to participate in the exercise PIOTR MACIEJ KACZYŃSKI | 8  
 
2.  How the legislative draft would be processed in the chamber: 
a.  the role of the European committee 
b.  the role of the specialised committees 
c.  whether the final decision should be taken by the plenary or by a committee 
3.  If there was a need to consult the regional parliament 
4.  If the breach existed. 
The exercise also showed that even if the capacity was there for the national parliaments to 
deliver on time, there was and is a problem in the definition of subsidiarity. The system failed to 
initiate any yellow or orange card procedure. The closest they came was the first attempt on the 
3
rd  railway package, when 30% (hence, short of 3%) of the votes indicated there was a 
subsidiarity problem. This can also be interpreted positively: there is no subsidiarity problem 
with the draft laws should there be less than a third (a quarter in the case justice and home 
affairs) of national parliaments taking the opposite view. 
5.  The application of the national parliaments’ prerogatives 
The current debate among national parliaments is about the necessary degree of cooperation is 
the best use of the tools allocated to them. For the moment most national chambers seem to 
focus on individual national powers and little attention is paid to the collective exercise. This 
‘individualism’ is clearly manifested not only in the decision (or, rather lack of it) on self-
organisation, but also in the two processes that are already ongoing. The first concerns the 
political dialogue with the European Commission, and the second concerns the use of the early 
warning system in the first year of the Treaty of Lisbon being in force.  
Political dialogue 
The Treaty talks about the information exchange channels between the national parliaments and 
the European institutions. The most visible – and oldest – is the political dialogue with the 
European Commission. This dialogue, however, is managed bilaterally between the 
Commission and each national parliamentary chamber. There is a group of legislatures that uses 
this mechanism quite often; others have never used this parliament. Tellingly, in bicameral 
systems the national senates are usually more active than national lower chambers. Also, none 
of the Romanian and Spanish chambers have so far used this tool. 9 | PAPER TIGERS OR SLEEPING BEAUTIES? 
 
Table 2. Communications between national parliamentary chambers and the European 
Commission, 2006-2009 (per chamber) 
Chamber  Country  2006 2007 2008 2009  2006-09 
Assembleia da República   Portugal  0  19  65  47  131 
Sénat    France  18 22 13 12  65 
Bundesrat   Germany  6  15  18  16  55 
Riksdagen   Sweden  0  17  16  18  51 
Senát   Czech Rep.  2  9  11  27  49 
House of Lords  UK  4  14  12  14  44 
Folketinget   Denmark  2  10  11  12  35 
Senato   Italy  0  0  8  17  25 
Tweede Kamer (jointly EK)*  Netherlands  2  1  5  15  23 
Camera dei Deputati   Italy  1  0  6  9  16 
Bundesrat   Austria  0  0  4  10  14 
Dáil Éireann / Seanad Éireann**  Ireland  0  1  7  6  14 
Vouli Ton Ellinon   Greece  0  0  3  10  13 
Bundestag   Germany  1  2  2  3  8 
Chambre des Députés   Luxembourg  2  0  2  3  7 
Seimas   Lithuania  2  1  0  3  6 
Sejm  Poland  1  0  5  0  6 
Sénat / Senaat   Belgium  2  0  2  2  6 
Országgyülés   Hungary  1  1  0  3  5 
Riigikogu   Estonia  2  0  2  1  5 
Saeima   Latvia  0  0  2  3  5 
Assemblée Nationale   France  1  1  0  2  4 
Chambre des Représentants  Belgium  0  1  1  2  4 
Eerste Kamer*  Netherlands  0  0  0  4  4 
Nationalrat Austria  0  0  0  4  4 
Državni Zbor   Slovenia  1  0  0  2  3 
House of Commons   UK  1  1  1  0  3 
Narodno Sobranie   Bulgaria  -  0  1  2  3 
Poslanecká Sněmovna   Czech Rep.  1  0  1  1  3 
Vouli Antiprosopon   Cyprus  0  0  2  1  3 
Eduskunta   Finland  1  0  0  0  1 
Národná Rada   Slovakia  1  0  0  0  1 
Il-Kamra Tad-Deputati   Malta  0  0  0  1  1 
Senat  Poland  1  0  0  0  1 
Camera Deputatilor   Romania  -  0  0  0  0 
Congreso de los Diputados   Spain  0  0  0  0  0 
Državni Svet   Slovenia  0  0  0  0  0 
Senado   Spain  0  0  0  0  0 
Senatul   Romania  -  0  0  0  0 
* Until 2009 Tweede Kamer and Eerste Kamer sent the communications jointly; those communications 
are included in Tweede Kamer’s statistics. In 2009 there were 8 communications sent by both chambers, 
7 by Tweede Kamer and 4 by Eerste Kamer. ** Both chambers sent communications together. 
Source: Annual Reports 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 on relations between the European Commission and 
national parliaments.  PIOTR MACIEJ KACZYŃSKI | 10  
 
Overall, the general trend is positive. Between 2006 and 2009 the volume of exchanges between 
the European Commission and national chambers rose five times from 53 to 250.  
Figure 1. Communications between national parliamentary chambers and the European 
Commission, 2006-2009 (total volume) 
 
Sources: Annual Reports 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 on relations between the European Commission and 
national parliaments.  
Inter-parliamentary cooperation 
Following the pilot projects, the national parliaments were supposed to organise themselves in 
terms of how to meet the eight-week deadline. A degree of organisation is necessary especially 
if meeting the eight-week deadline is to be taken seriously. The technical capacity try-outs were 
organised through COSAC; the process was then centralised. However, at its 43
rd meeting in 
Madrid in May/June 2010, COSAC decided to terminate the subsidiarity checks try-outs, 
although these checks may be conducted on an ad hoc basis at the proposal of a rotating 
presidency.
6 The decision taken was that there would be no harmonised cooperation between 
national parliaments, and the Conference “urged national parliaments to intensify their use of 
IPEX and other forms of cooperation in order to provide mutual information concerning their 
respective activities and standpoints”.
7 
In practice it meant that the coordination remains loose. The procedure looks like this: each 
chamber of national parliaments receives a draft legislative proposal from the Commission (or 
any other institution that drafts the proposal in question) and initiates (or not) its own procedure. 
If it decides to scrutinise the draft law, it informs other national parliaments about this through 
IPEX. Should there be a subsidiarity breach, it transmits its opinion to the Commission (or other 
institution). The Commission is generally open to cooperation with national parliaments going 
                                                      
6 Conclusions of the XLIII COSAC, http://www.cosac.eu/en/meetings/Madrid2010/ordinary.doc/ 
conclus.pdf/.  
7 Ibid, point 1.5. 
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beyond the subsidiarity checks and, since the so-called Barroso Initiative in 2006 (see above), 
also welcomes non-subsidiarity related comments. 
What is important is that each chamber initiates the procedure individually. When doing so, it 
informs other national chambers through IPEX. A problem might arise if the subsidiarity control 
were to be executed permanently by only a few national chambers and other chambers would 
look into the issue only if a breach were found by the ‘initiators’. Here, the issue of late timing 
might arise – that is, if a chamber that regularly scrutinises all proposals suddenly ‘discovers’ a 
breach, there might simply not be enough time for other parliaments to complete their scrutiny. 
The only real early information exchange among national parliaments goes through the MMMs 
(Monday Morning Meetings) of representatives of national parliaments in Brussels. 
The deadline of eight weeks might seem short for a number of reasons. It will be suspended for 
the month of August, and in many parliaments the final decision on a subsidiarity breach can 
only be taken by the full plenary or after a number of consultations with specialist committees. 
In some cases the general European committees can take legally binding positions on behalf of 
the entire chamber, in other member states information about a given member state 
government’s position on a certain issue might be required. In the bicameral systems, 
cooperation between parliamentary chambers is envisaged. Finally, in the countries where 
regional parliaments have legislative powers – it is up to a given member state to determine the 
domestic procedure in such a way that the reasonable opinion could be provided within eight 
weeks. 
The first year of using the procedure shows that the existing forms of cooperation are either too 
weak or poorly used. Only 59% of the scrutiny processes initiated were completed on time 
within the eight-week period. Only eight national chambers completed their procedures in all 
cases for which they initiated the subsidiarity control. Twelve others had significant problems 
with less than half of initiated subsidiarity controls being completed on time. Three of them 
have not completed a single process they started!
8  
  
                                                      
8 One explanation – yet only a partial one – of the poor result of ending on time is the methodology used 
at IPEX. In most countries the reporting to IPEX has not been yet fully operationalised and needs further 
strengthening.   PIOTR MACIEJ KACZYŃSKI | 12  
 
Table 3. Reasoned Opinions (“orange card” procedure) between 1 Dec 2009 and 2 Nov 2009 
(out of 24, ranked in order completed scrutiny procedures) 
Chamber Country  Started 
scrutiny 
Completed 
scrutiny 
Reasoned 
Opinions sent 
Poslanecká Sněmovna   Czech Republic  23  22 (96%)  1 
Senato della Repubblica   Italy  24  21 (88%)  0 
Bundesrat   Germany  19  19  1 
Congreso de los Diputados   Spain  16  16  0 
Riksdagen   Sweden  24  13 (54%)  1 
Nationalrat  Austria  15  13 (87%)   2 
Assembleia da República   Portugal  13  11 (85%)  0 
Bundesrat   Austria  11  10 (91%)  1 
Bundestag   Germany  24  9 (38%)  1 
Dáil Éireann / Seanad Éireann   Ireland  7  7  0 
Assemblée Nationale   France  6  6  0 
Sejm  Poland  22  5 (23%)  0 
Senát   Czech Republic  8  4 (50%)  1 
Chambre des Députés   Luxembourg  6  4 (67%)  0 
Seimas   Lithuania  4  4  0 
Sénat / Senaat   Belgium  4  4  0 
House of Lords  United Kingdom  7  3 (43%)  0 
Folketinget   Denmark  9  3 (33%)  1 
Camera dei Deputati   Italy  9  3 (33%)  0 
Senat  Poland  22  3 (14%)  2 
House Commons   United Kingdom  4  2 (50%)  0 
Sénat   France  3  1 (33%)  1 
Vouli Ton Ellinon   Greece  1  1  0 
Saeima   Latvia  1  1  0 
Eerste Kamer   The Netherlands  4  1 (25%)  1 
Eduskunta   Finland  19  1 (5%)  0 
Tweede Kamer   The Netherlands  3  0  1 
Riigikogu   Estonia  0  0  0 
Országgyülés   Hungary  0  0  0 
Chambre des Représentants  Belgium  6  0 (0%)  0 
Vouli Antiprosopon   Cyprus  0  0  0 
Narodno Sobranie   Bulgaria  0  0  0 
Državni Zbor   Slovenia  2  0 (0%)  0 
Il-Kamra Tad-Deputati   Malta  0  0  0 
Národná Rada   Slovakia  2  0 (0%)  0 
Senado   Spain  0  0  0 
Camera Deputatilor   Romania  0  0  0 
Senatul   Romania  0  0  0 
Državni Svet   Slovenia  0  0  0 
Source: Own calculations based on data from IPEX. 
None of the draft laws subject to subsidiarity control to date has gathered enough reasoned 
opinions to initiate any of the ‘cards’ procedures. The closest to meeting the threshold were two 
draft laws: 1) draft directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (COD/2010/0207) and 2) draft 
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seasonal employment (COD/2010/0210). Yet both cases have shown that the real capacity (not 
virtual as in the try-outs) to produce a reasoned opinion claiming a subsidiarity breach is 
questionable. On the deposit guarantee schemes Directive, 16 parliaments started the procedure 
with 18 votes (33%). Should they all finish on time and all find a subsidiarity breach, it would 
be enough to start a yellow card procedure. Instead only five parliaments finished on time and 
four issued reasoned opinions (6 votes, 11%). On the draft directive on conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment, 20 parliaments 
started the procedure with 25 votes (46%). Similarly, if most of them finished within the eight- 
week deadline and issued reasoned opinions, the yellow card procedure could be initiated. 
Instead only nine parliaments finished on time and seven issued reasoned opinions (seven votes, 
13%). 
6.  Political consequences of the new system 
The fact that there were major problems in meeting the deadline shows that further actions to 
improve national procedures are still necessary. Interestingly, the lack of definition of 
subsidiarity at the European level can also be observed at the national level. In the case of the 
draft directive on conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of 
seasonal employment, both chambers of the Polish parliament finished the scrutiny on time; one 
chamber found a breach (the Senat) while the other did not (the Sejm). Hence, the definition of 
subsidiarity at the national level has not yet been fully clarified. 
A bigger question is the impact of the new subsidiarity control mechanism on the decision-
making of the European Union. Clearly, the primary function of the mechanism is to challenge 
the European Commission. In the worst-case scenario, the Commission could be paralysed and 
all its proposals challenged by the national chambers. In the best-case scenario, if the national 
parliaments initiate the procedure but do not find any breach of the subsidiarity clause, the 
Commission position could be strengthened vis-à-vis the European Parliament and especially 
the Council. In any case, the national parliaments cannot remain mute and need to perform their 
tasks to scrutinize draft European legislation. The existing trend of growing communication 
between the Commission and national parliaments (see above) can suggest a growing awareness 
in some of national parliaments about the possibilities of influencing the EU decision-making 
process at an earlier stage. 
The experience of the first 24 files subject to the subsidiarity control also reveals another 
element. What will be the impact of the subsidiarity control on the negotiating position of the 
national governments in the Council in situations when there are a few reasoned opinions, but 
not enough to trigger either of the card mechanisms? First, if there is clearly no subsidiarity 
breach – this should empower the Commission’s position. Yet second, those governments 
whose national parliaments have identified subsidiarity problems will most likely remove the 
problem to the negotiations nevertheless. Third, the governments whose national parliaments 
did not finish the scrutiny procedure in time (but finished later, for example, and could 
communicate their findings to the national government instead of the European Commission) 
would also be interested in the subsidiarity situation. Finally, those national parliaments that 
found the breach would clearly be disappointed. Should their problem continue to exist in the 
finally adopted legislation, there would be a natural tendency to take the issue to the European 
Court of Justice.  
The nature of relationships between national governments and their national parliaments is 
probably going to be central to the application of subsidiarity control. These relationships vary 
greatly across the EU. There are cases where the parliaments are working in political unison 
with governments; hence there is a risk of governments using the new mechanism to achieve 
political objectives (or to delay or even derail the process). Alternatively, the empowerment of PIOTR MACIEJ KACZYŃSKI | 14  
 
national parliaments vis-à-vis the national government can create new national dynamics that 
limit the freedom of the government in the formulation of a national negotiating position. This 
relationship will also be central in the process of taking the issue of subsidiarity control to the 
Luxembourg court. 
In future years we are likely to see new dynamics and a much greater negative involvement of 
the national parliaments. In effect, this can contribute to enhancing the legitimate mandate of the 
adopted laws. There would be less room for political anti-Brussels accusations, as politically the 
national parliaments would now be co-responsible for the European legislation, not only in the 
ex post transposition phase, but also in the drafting of the original laws. This may stimulate a 
real public debate on the Commission proposals in many member countries.  
7.  The political readiness to be engaged 
About a quarter of all legal rules applied across the European Union originate from European 
decision-making. Various studies have been carried out in many member states over many 
years. A precise EU-wide figure is impossible to give. For example, 29% of all new laws 
adopted in Bulgaria in the first legislative year of the current legislature (2009/2010) originate 
from the EU and 23% in Sweden in 2009. The German Bundesrat considers that about 36% of 
all laws it adopted between 1980 and 2005 had their source in the EU. Yet the Danish figure for 
2007 is only 10%. The French Assemblée Nationale figure for 2007 was 20%, while the Irish 
calculations for the period 1992-2009 were at 29%, and the Dutch for the period 1994-2004 
were at 21%. The Italian parliament puts the figure somewhere above 20%. In Latvia and 
Lithuania the figure is below 20% over the years. The British calculations suggest that about 
15% of the laws adopted there come from the EU (based on the period 1987-2009). 
Figure 2. Net trust towards national parliaments in Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland   
(2008-2010) 
 
Source: Felix Roth, “The Eurozone Crisis and Its Effects on Citizens’ Trust in National Parliaments”, 
CEPS Commentary, 8 December 2010 (available at (http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/4013). 15 | PAPER TIGERS OR SLEEPING BEAUTIES? 
 
Realisation of this fact is crucial to understanding the position of national legislators in the 
European Union. This is particularly important if one considers that not only the procedural and 
technical elements are necessary for the system to work properly. The engagement and 
dedication of the national decision-makers is absolutely critical. To date they have a rather 
limited record, however. As trust in national parliaments decreases, their involvement becomes 
more important. 
8. Concluding  questions 
The role of national parliaments in the system should not be an exclusively negative one. They 
should also contribute constructively to the ‘good functioning’ of the Union. The negative 
empowerment, or power to say ‘no,’ gives the national parliaments a power-bargaining position. 
With time, however, once the mechanism settles down and the feeling of co-responsibility is 
more widely shared among the national parliamentarians, this instrument can in fact contribute 
to the constructive engagement of the national parliaments, too. 
In the short term, national parliaments face the challenge of how to improve coordination 
among themselves. Clearly, the system in place does not work; there is still huge room for 
improvement within the national chambers’ procedures and staff responsibilities. Sometimes it 
requires a changed mindset and the use of instruments never used before (especially in Spain 
and Romania in political dialogue with the European Commission). But it also concerns the 
possibility of a more centralised coordination in the use of subsidiarity control. The dilemmas 
(or confusion) about which powers are individually allocated to national chambers (more 
important) and which ones are allocated only to all the national parliaments collectively (hence, 
politically less interesting) should cease. 
The appetite for engagement in the European decision-making process, at least among some of 
the national parliaments, is reasonably high. They have the capacity to act and seem to have the 
political motivation to remain alert to subsidiarity breaches. There seems to be a feeling that the 
subsidiarity principles check is not enough and the national parliaments would like to reach out 
beyond those limits. The limitations of the Barroso Initiative are striking: it has engaged the 
parliaments constructively by sending all Commission documents to the national parliaments 
since 2006. Yet, it does not give them any power of veto. The problem is, however, that their 
greater negative empowerment could further complicate the already complex European 
decision-making mechanisms. One idea floated among national parliamentarians is to provide 
for greater involvement of national parliaments in European foreign policy-making. There are, 
however, very different traditions among member countries on the role of national parliaments 
in this field. Another idea is an expectation that the Commission substantiate its responses to the 
opinions sent by national parliaments.  
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